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27 March 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

State Department review
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DAILY BRIEF

*Cuba:
this year's sugar crop is likely to be as much as a
million tons short of last year's poor crop.

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Among the reasons for the poor expectations
this year is the fact that the industry has not yet
recovered from the policy followed in 1960 and 1961
of diversifying agriculture by transferring sugar

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lands to other crops. In addition, the five-month drought last year resulted in cane of poorer quality with reduced sugar content--a fact noted in several recent speeches by Cuban leaders.

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
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Cuba-USSR: Photography [] indicates that a new SAM site has been established at Majana, about 10 miles south of the Soviet camp at Artemisa.

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Guidance equipment and launchers are in place, but no missile transporters have been observed in the area. This equipment may have been transferred from the Bahia Honda SAM site, which was evacuated

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A preliminary scan of photography [] shows activity of undetermined significance at three of the four Soviet armored camps in Cuba.

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Two convoy formations--one of 10 cargo trucks and the other of 21--were observed in the Remedios camp at about 0845 EST. []

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The seven lowboy trailers observed at Remedios [] had been removed [] as had six tanks or self-propelled guns.

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[] about 0815 EST. There was no apparent change in the new tent area [] Three tanks or self-propelled guns had been removed from their former positions.

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At Holguin, four tanks or self-propelled guns, one unidentified tracked vehicle, and one antitank rocket (Snapper) carrier have been removed from their former parking places. []

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Guatemala: The 30-day state of siege declared by President Ydigoras on 25 March was probably intended to placate the army, which has been pressing for action to prevent the imminent return of leftist former President Arevalo.

This action gives the government legal authority to prevent Arevalo's return from exile. It also places Ydigoras in a position of appearing publicly to oppose Arevalo's bid to regain the presidency in the forthcoming elections.

Ydigoras' intentions regarding Arevalo, however, are still far from clear. Prior to the state of siege, he had repeatedly warned US officials that, in his opinion, government action to prevent Arevalo's candidacy might make him a martyr and thereby increase his already strong public support. The President has also said recently that Arevalo should and could be defeated in a free election.

The present state of siege can be renewed for additional 30-day periods with the confirmation of congress, which could probably be obtained without much difficulty.

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France: The government's hopes for an early settlement of the coal strike have given way to the belief that it will drag on for several more weeks.

The government considers that the miners have forced a test of strength by rejecting its latest offer to the unions. One cabinet officer told the American Embassy on 25 March that the government is determined to hold the line against inflationary pressures and will make no concessions that would compromise wage-price stability.

Another cabinet official believes that the miners will eventually accept terms only slightly better than those now on the counter. He anticipated, however, that settlement of the coal strike would not end the government's difficulties with other public workers who are also agitating for better working conditions.

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Thailand: [The government is pushing efforts to cope with subversion and disaffection in the border areas]

[Prime Minister Sarit has traveled to the frontier areas four times since the first of the year to assess the effectiveness of the government's program of socio-economic aid to the villagers. This interest contrasts sharply with Bangkok's previous indifference, which tended to alienate the local inhabitants.]

[The government has also made large numbers of security arrests in these areas]

[In the economically depressed northeastern provinces, particularly, there is evidence of increased Communist infiltration and propaganda among the villagers, who are traditionally oriented toward Laos. American officials traveling there recently have encountered bands of propagandists and observed their success in estranging formerly friendly villagers]

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Pakistan-Afghanistan: [The Pakistani-Afghan border issue may be a step nearer resolution]

[The director general of the Pakistani Ministry of External Affairs has told an American Embassy official that he believes Afghanistan might be permitted to reopen its consulate in Peshawar if the new Kabul regime sincerely desires good relations with Pakistan.]

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[This is the first indication that Pakistan is considering a concession on this key problem.]

[In past negotiations, Pakistan has offered other concessions but has refused to budge on the Peshawar consulate. The Pakistanis recognize that former Prime Minister Daud's prestige among the Pushtoon frontier tribes was heavily committed to its reopening. Their refusal to concede on this issue effectively prevented the Daud regime from considering the other concessions.]

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NOTES

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*Communist China - India: Peiping's note to New Delhi of 25 March charging Indian intrusions into Chinese territory near Sikkim will heighten tension in an area which remained quiet during the hostilities last fall. The latest Chinese protest, following other recent charges of aggressive Indian activities in Ladakh, is intended to suggest the danger of new border clashes if the Indians do not keep their distance from the Chinese forces.

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Brazil: There are indications that the Czech commercial representative in Recife, the capital of Pernambuco state, will soon become a full-fledged consul there. This would be the first bloc consular post in Recife; the establishment of others may be in the offing. Since a pro-Communist state governor was inaugurated on 31 January, many representatives from the bloc have visited the city, including a high-ranking Soviet commercial official who was apparently interested both in expanding Soviet trade with Pernambuco and setting up a consulate in Recife.

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